FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Eckardt v Sims Ltd [2022] FCA 1609

File number:	NSD 220 of 2019
Judgment of:	WIGNEY J
Date of judgment:	23 December 2022
Catchwords:	REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – settlement approval application – whether Court should approve settlement approval application per s 33V(1) of <i>Federal Court of Australia Act 1976</i> (Cth) – consideration of applicable principles governing whether settlement approval application is fair and reasonable with regard to group members' interests as a whole – funding equalisation – whether funding expenses should include applicant's "after the event" insurance costs – proposed interim and final confidentiality regimes – settlement and confidentiality orders made
Legislation:	Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA, ss 33V, 33V(1), 33V(2), 33X(4), 37AF, 37AG(1)(a)
Cases cited:	Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2020) 385 ALR 625; [2020] FCA 1885 BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574;
	[2019] HCA 45 Camilleri v Trust Company (Nominees) Ltd [2015] FCA 1468
	Court v Spotless Group Holdings Ltd [2020] FCA 1730
	Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (No 2) (2006) 236 ALR 322; [2006] FCA 1388
	Endeavour River Pty Ltd v MG Responsible Entity Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 968
	Haselhurst v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd t/as Toyota Australia [2022] NSWSC 1076
	Perera v GetSwift Ltd (2018) 263 FCR 1; [2018] FCA 732
	Wetdal Pty Ltd as Trustee for the BlueCo Two Superannuation Fund v Estia Health Ltd [2021] FCA 475
	Williamson v Sydney Olympic Park Authority [2022] NSWSC 1618

General Division

Division:

Registry: New South Wales

National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency

Number of paragraphs: 56

Date of hearing: 11 October 2022

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr W Edwards SC with Mr A Edwards

Solicitor for the Applicant: William Roberts Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr I Ahmed

Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

NSD 220 of 2019

BETWEEN: PETER ECKARDT

Applicant

AND: SIMS LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY: WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER: 23 DECEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Approval of settlement

- 1. Pursuant to s 33V of the *Federal Court of Australia Act 1976* (Cth) (**Act**), the settlement of the proceeding is approved upon the terms set out in:
 - (a) the Deed of Settlement at pages 115 to 143 of Exhibit BP-10 to the affidavit of Bill Petrovski sworn on 1 October 2022, as varied by the Deed of Variation at pages 144 to 150 of Exhibit BP-10 (**Deed**); and
 - (b) the revised Settlement Distribution Scheme, in the form at pages 15 to 33 of Exhibit BP-13 of the affidavit of Blagoj (Bill) Petrovski sworn on 12 October 2022 (**Scheme**).
- 2. Pursuant to s 33ZF of the Act, the Applicant is authorised, *nunc pro tunc*, to enter into the Deed and to give effect to the settlement and all transactions contemplated by it for and on behalf of the group members as defined in paragraph 2 of the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim (save for any person who has opted out of the proceeding) (**Group Members**).
- 3. Pursuant to s 33ZB of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the settlement of the proceeding are the Applicant, Respondent, Group Members, William Roberts Pty Ltd and the Funder.

Referee's Reports

4. Pursuant to s 54A of the Act and r 28.67 of the *Federal Court Rules 2011* (**Rules**), the Court adopts in full the two reports of the Referee appointed pursuant to order 18 of the Court's orders made on 6 July 2022, being the reports from Ian Ramsey-Stewart dated 23 September 2022 and 28 September 2022, as provided by Mr Ramsey-Stewart to the Associate to Wigney J.

Appointment of Administrator

5. Pursuant to ss. 33ZF and 23 of the Act, William Roberts Pty Ltd is appointed Administrator of the Scheme, to act in accordance with the Scheme and have the powers and immunities contemplated by the Scheme.

Approval of amounts to be deducted pursuant to the Scheme

- 6. Pursuant to s 33V of the Act, the following amounts are approved for the purposes of the Scheme (utilising defined terms from it):
 - the amount of \$6,259,515.64 for "Project Costs" to be paid to the Funder, comprising the sum of: (A) the amount of \$5,461,430.45 legal costs and disbursements in including the fees paid to the Referee in the amount of \$27,500, and (B) the amount of \$798,085.19 to be paid to the Funder in respect of after-the-event insurance premiums, including applicable tax;
 - (b) the amount of \$5,440,557.67 for "Funding Commission" to be paid to the Funder;
 - (c) the amount of \$3,022,684.49 for "Unpaid Legal Costs" to be paid to William Roberts;
 - (d) an amount up to \$241,123.95 for "Administration Costs"; and
 - (e) the amount of \$10,000 to be paid to the Applicant for the "Applicant's Reimbursement Payment".

Deemed Registrant

7. Further to Order 6 made on 6 July 2022, the person identified at paragraph 11(b) of the affidavit of Blagoj (Bill) Petrovski sworn on 12 October 2022 be treated as a "Registered Group Member" for the purposes of the Scheme.

Costs and security

- 8. Order 4 of the orders made on 13 August 2021 requiring the provision of security for costs is vacated and all deeds of indemnity executed and provided by ICP Capital Pty Ltd and AmTrust Europe Limited as security for the Respondent's costs, be returned by the Respondent to the Applicant by providing them to the Applicant's solicitors or destroyed by the Respondent within 56 days from the date of these orders.
- 9. Pursuant to r 2.43 of the Rules, the monies paid into Court on 7 December 2020 in the amount of \$40,000 pursuant order 5 of the orders made by the Court on 1 December 2020 as security for the Respondent's costs, be returned to the Applicant by deposit into the Applicant's solicitors' trust account. The Applicant's Solicitors are to pay the \$40,000 to the Funder within 5 business days of receipt as cleared funds into their trust account.
- 10. All costs orders made to date in the proceeding are vacated.
- 11. No order as to costs.

Dismissal after completion of distribution

- 12. The proceeding is dismissed 7 days after the Administrator (as that term is defined in the Scheme) notifies the Court and the parties in writing that the distribution under the Scheme is complete.
- 13. Upon the dismissal of the proceeding, the Respondent, and the Respondent's legal representatives are released from the undertaking to the Court noted in the Court's orders dated 21 August 2020.

Confidentiality orders

- 14. Until further order, pursuant to ss. 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, and in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the material identified in **Annexure A** to these orders is:
 - (a) to be treated as confidential;
 - (b) not to be published or made available and any electronic version thereof is to be treated in an analogous fashion;
 - (c) not to be disclosed to any person other than:
 - (i) the Court;
 - (ii) the Applicant and his legal representatives; or

- (iii) ICP Capital Pty Ltd and Investor Claim Partner Pty Ltd (together, ICP or Funder) and their legal representatives; and
- (d) not to be disclosed to the Respondent or its legal representatives, other than to the extent that the material identified in Annexure A has previously been disclosed to them during this proceeding.
- 15. Until 49 days from the date of any order approving the proposed settlement in these proceedings under s 33V of the Act, and in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the material identified in **Annexure B** to these orders is:
 - (a) to be treated as confidential;
 - (b) not to be published or made available and any electronic version thereof is to be treated in an analogous fashion;
 - (c) not to be disclosed to any person other than:
 - (i) the Court;
 - (ii) the Applicant and his legal representatives; or
 - (iii) ICP and its legal representatives; and
 - (d) not to be disclosed to the Respondent or its legal representatives, other than to the extent that the material identified in Annexure B has previously been disclosed to them during this proceeding.
- 16. Within 28 days from the date of these orders, the Applicant is to file with the Court redacted copies of each of the documents set out in Annexures A and B (except those documents filed by the Funder set out in order 17 below), with those redactions to be applied in accordance with the details set out in Annexures A and B.
- 17. Within 28 days from the date of these orders, the Funder is to file with the Court a redacted copy of the affidavit of John Walker affirmed 11 October 2022 (with Confidential Exhibit JW-2) with those redactions to be applied in accordance with the details set out in Annexure B.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

- In 2019, the applicant commenced a representative proceeding pursuant to pt IVA of the *Federal Court of Australia Act 1976* (Cth) (**FCA Act**) against **Sims** Limited. The applicant claimed that Sims was liable to compensate persons who, like him, had purchased securities in Sims during certain periods in circumstances where the value of those securities were allegedly inflated as a result of alleged misleading and deceptive conduct by Sims and Sims' failure to comply with its continuing disclosure obligations.
- The trial of the action was listed to commence on 4 July 2022. On 17 May 2022, however, the parties reached an "in-principle" settlement agreement during a mediation. A deed containing the essential terms of that agreement was subsequently executed on 10 June 2022. Under the terms of the settlement, Sims was required to pay the sum of \$29.5 million. After certain sums of money were deducted from the settlement sum, the balance (together with any accrued interest) was to be distributed to participating group members in accordance with an agreed settlement scheme. The amounts to be deducted from the settlement sum, in general terms, comprised the applicant's legal costs and disbursements, a small reimbursement payment to the applicant, administration costs and commission payable to the funder, and expenses incurred by the litigation funders. The litigation funders were Investor Claim Partner Pty Ltd and ICP Capital Pty Ltd. As the litigation funders are most likely related or associated entities, I will refer to them collectively as **the funder**.
- While the parties agreed to settle the proceeding, a representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court: s 33V(1) of the FCA Act. If the Court approves the settlement, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under the settlement: s 33V(2) of the FCA Act.
- The current applicant has applied for the Court's approval of the settlement and the distribution of moneys to be paid under it. The application is not opposed by Sims. There is accordingly no contradictor. The Court must nevertheless determine whether the proposed settlement is a fair and reasonable compromise of the claims made on behalf of the group members and ensure

that the settlement has been undertaken in the interests of the group members as a whole, not just in the interests of the applicant and the respondent.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

The principles that are applicable to the approval of the settlement under s 33V of the FCA Act are well-settled, well-known, not in dispute on this application, and require no further recitation or explication in these reasons. They are accurately set out in the applicant's written submissions and largely reflected in the Court's Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA) issued on 20 December 2019. I have considered and applied the relevant principles in determining this approval application.

Notice to the group members

- Section 33X(4) of the FCA Act provides that, unless the Court is satisfied that it is just to do so, an application for approval of a settlement under s 33V must not be determined unless notice has been given to the group members. I am satisfied that the notice requirement in s 33X(4) has been met in this case. On 6 July 2022, I approved the form and distribution of a notice to group members concerning the proposed settlement and the group members' right to oppose the approval should they wish to do so. There is evidence that the notices were distributed to group members in accordance with the orders made on 6 July 2022.
- No group member gave notice of any opposition to the settlement. No group member appeared at the hearing in opposition to the settlement approval. The fact that no group member opposed the settlement approval is not, however, determinative. Indeed, I am mindful that, given the nature of this proceeding being, in general terms, a securities class action with a relatively large number of group members with fairly modest claims, I should not give too much weight to the absence of any opposition to the settlement approval.

Fairness and reasonableness of the compromise

As is usually the case, counsel for the applicant in the proceeding furnished written opinions in respect of the fairness and reasonableness of the compromise and the terms of the settlement. Confidentiality orders were sought and will, in due course, be made in respect of those opinions. I have read and closely considered the opinions. For obvious reasons, I will not disclose or discuss the contents of the opinions in any detail. It suffices to note the following conclusions that I have reached after taking into account the opinions expressed by counsel.

- First, I am satisfied that the settlement sum of \$29.5 million to be paid by Sims represents a fair and reasonable compromise in respect of the group members' claims as a whole. That is so having regard to the nature and complexity of the claims, the likely or probable maximum recovery by the group members on a best-case scenario and the risks and potential difficulties in establishing liability, causation, loss and damage in the particular circumstances of this case.
- Second, I am satisfied that the releases in the settlement deed are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

Fairness of the proposed distribution scheme

- The means and manner by which the settlement sum is to be distributed is set out in a document entitled 'Settlement Distribution Scheme' (SDS). It is necessary to determine whether the terms of the SDS are fair and reasonable from the perspective of the group members as a whole. The SDS deals with both the deductions from the settlement sum and the distribution of the balance after the deductions, including how the balance is to be distributed between the group members. I will deal with the fairness and reasonableness of the deductions separately.
- The confidential opinions of counsel address the method and means by which individual group members' claims are to be calculated and how the balance of the settlement sum is to be distributed between the members. There is undoubtedly an element of complexity involved in calculating the individual claims of the group members. That is because they involve different quantities of securities which were acquired at different times and in different circumstances. The strengths and risks of each individual group member claim differs to a certain extent depending on when the securities in question were purchased.
 - The SDS applies a formula to the particulars of each group member's claim to determine their share in the balance of the settlement sum. It is unnecessary to describe the precise nature of the formula. It suffices to record that I am satisfied that the formula and its use to calculate group member claims and to distribute the balance of the settlement sum is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. It may not be perfect, and it may be possible to conceive of other methods or procedures to distribute the funds amongst group members. That is, however, essentially beside the point, particularly if the other methods, though perhaps "more perfect", are also more expensive to apply and administer: see *Camilleri v Trust Company (Nominees)*Ltd [2015] FCA 1468 at [43]. Importantly, I am satisfied that the formula treats group members whose relevant circumstances are the same or similar, or who fall within the same cohort, in

essentially the same way. It does not unfairly discriminate against any particular group members or any class or classes of group members.

Reasonableness of the proposed deductions from the settlement sum

The reasonableness of the proposed deductions from the settlement sum to persons or entities other than the group members is perhaps the most contentious or potentially contentious element of the proposed settlement. That is largely because of the size of some of the deductions. The deductions fall into the following broad categories: first, legal costs and disbursements; second, approval costs; third, administration costs; fourth, a reimbursement payment to the applicant; and fifth, payments to the litigation funder.

I will deal with the least contentious deductions first. I will also separately deal with what the applicant's counsel called the "fund equalisation order" or "FEO". That label is perhaps somewhat of a misnomer given that the orders sought by the applicant do not include any such order. Rather, the applicant utilised the label to describe the fact that the SDS involves the calculation of the amounts to be distributed to individual group members only after the deductions are paid out of the settlement sum. The effect of that approach is all group members pay an equal share of the deductions. That is particularly important in the case of the deductions comprising the applicant's legal fees and the litigation funding commission, those being the two largest deductions. The effect of deducting those amounts prior to calculating each group member's share of the settlement sum is that each group member will bear an equal share of the legal costs and the funder's commission, even if some of the group members were not contractually bound to do so given that they had not entered into any retainer agreement with the applicant's solicitors, or any funding agreement with the funder.

Applicant's reimbursement payment

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The proposed amount to be paid to the applicant to reimburse him for the time and expense of acting as the applicant in the proceeding is \$10,000. It is generally considered to be reasonable for an applicant to be compensated for the time and expense in acting in that role: see *Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (No 2)* (2006) 236 ALR 322; [2006] FCA 1388 at [76].

The applicant has adduced evidence about the time he has spent dealing with the litigation in his capacity as applicant. I am satisfied that the applicant has adequately explained the basis

of the reimbursement amount. It is, in all the circumstances, a fairly modest claim and a very small payment, particularly in comparison to the other deductions.

Approval costs

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An amount of \$142,980.89 is to be deducted from the settlement sum on account of the approval costs. That amount is to be paid to the applicant's solicitors and relates to the anticipated legal costs and disbursements relating to the approval application and settlement hearing. On 6 July 2022, I appointed a costs referee to determine whether, inter alia, the applicant's legal costs were fair and reasonable. The referee prepared a report in due course. That report is discussed in more detail later in these reasons in respect of the deductions referable to the legal costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the prosecution of the proceeding generally.

It suffices at this point to note that the referee separately addressed the prospective fees and costs associated with the approval application and hearing. He concluded that \$142,980.89 would be reasonable fees for the approval of the settlement. That figure was based on an estimate provided by the applicant's solicitors, plus a 15 per cent buffer to account for possible unforeseen complications. While this appears to be a fairly large amount for an unopposed approval application, I am satisfied, based on the referee's opinion, that it is not unreasonable. I should also note in this context that the applicant adduced, as would be expected, fairly voluminous evidence in support of the approval application. That evidence included the confidential opinions of counsel.

Administration costs

An amount of \$241,123.95 is to be deducted from the settlement sum on account of the anticipated costs of administering the settlement scheme. That sum is to be paid to the settlement administrator, who also happens to be the applicant's solicitors. The reasonableness of the proposed deduction for administration costs is also addressed in the referee's report. The work associated with settlement administration in a case such as this includes: the compilation of claims information; consultation with group members; the calculation of entitlements; the review of those calculations where necessary; and the distribution of payments. On the basis of 1450 participating group members, the administration cost per group member is just over \$165. The reasonableness of that amount is confirmed by the referee. There is no apparent

reason why the referee's opinion should be discounted or the reasonableness of the deduction doubted.

Legal fees and disbursements

The total amount referable to legal fees and disbursements which is proposed to be deducted from the settlement sum is \$8,484,114.94. That amount is made up of two sums of money: first, the sum of \$5,461,430.45, which is the amount of the legal fees and disbursements that has already been paid to the applicant's solicitors by the litigation funder and is a component of the "project costs" to be paid to the funder; and second, the sum of \$3,022,684.49, which is the amount of the legal fees and disbursements not yet paid to the applicant's solicitors. The latter figure includes the approval costs and is to be paid to the applicant's solicitors.

It is worth noting that of the almost \$8.5 million paid or payable in respect of legal fees and disbursements, approximately \$2.3 million is referable to fees paid or payable to experts retained by the applicant and about \$650,000 represents fees paid or payable to counsel.

The total amount paid or payable in respect of legal fees and disbursements referable to the conduct of the proceeding is, on just about any view, a staggeringly large amount. That is so even having regard to the nature and complexity of the proceeding, the length of time it was on foot, and the fact that it was settled fairly shortly before trial.

I initially expressed to the parties a sense of disquiet concerning the size of the deduction referable to legal fees and disbursements. I have, however, given close and careful consideration to the referee's report concerning the legal fees and disbursements. The referee is a highly qualified and experienced expert in respect of the quantification of legal costs. He performed a thorough and detailed review and analysis of the fees and disbursements by reference to spreadsheets and tax invoices which were provided to him. He gave detailed consideration to the allocation of work between solicitors of differing expertise and counsel, and the hourly rates charged. He ultimately expressed the view that fees and disbursements totalling \$8,488,033.38 would be reasonable in all the circumstances.

While the legal fees and disbursements are undoubtedly very high, I can see no reason why the referee's opinion should not be accepted. Accordingly, despite my initial disquiet, I am satisfied that the amount to be deducted from the settlement sum in respect of legal fees and disbursements is reasonable. I should perhaps reiterate here that the notice to group members

in relation to the settlement approval disclosed that the amount representing legal fees and disbursements that would be deducted from the settlement sum would likely be in the vicinity of the amount for legal fees and disbursements in respect of which approval is now sought. As already noted, no group member registered any objection to the proposed settlement.

I therefore propose to approve the amounts referable to legal fees and disbursements as part of the overall settlement approval.

Funder commission and expenses

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The proposed settlement and the orders sought by the applicant involve two significant payments to be made to the litigation funder. The first is the payment of \$5,440,557.67 in respect of funding commission. The second is the payment of \$798,085.19 as part of the project costs in respect of "after the event" (ATE) insurance premiums paid or payable by the funder.

The commission payment of \$5,440,557.67 has been calculated by reference to the funder's contractual entitlements pursuant to the terms of the funding agreements which were entered into by those group members who registered and signed retainer agreements with the applicant's solicitors (**the funded group members**). The funding agreements provided, in summary, that the funder was entitled to commission totalling 25.3 per cent of the claim proceeds inclusive of GST. There was a contractual entitlement to have the commission calculated on a different basis which potentially would have given rise to a larger commission in the circumstances. The funder wisely elected not to seek that larger amount. It is highly unlikely I would have approved that larger sum as part of the settlement.

It is worth emphasising at this point that only the funded group members agreed to pay, and are contractually bound to pay, the funder a commission of 25.3 per cent of the settlement proceeds. As has already been noted, however, the settlement is structured in such a way that the funder's commission is to be effectively equally borne by *all* group members, including those that never signed any funding agreement. That issue is discussed in more detail later. In any event, the mere fact that the funder is contractually entitled to recover a 25.3 per cent commission from the funded group members, which in this case totals almost \$5.5 million, does not mean that the Court must approve that payment as part of the settlement. The question ultimately is whether the amount of the commission payable to the funder is such that the settlement as a whole is fair and reasonable. The following points may be noted in respect of that issue.

First, a relatively large proportion of the group members in this matter are funded group members who signed funding agreements and therefore agreed to pay the funder 25 per cent of the amount recovered. The registered group members are entitled to 72.9 per cent of the settlement sum having regard to the distribution formula. There is no basis to infer that the funded group members were not aware that the commission payable to the funder would be otherwise than a significant sum. Nor is there any basis for inferring that the funded group members, or a large proportion of them, were other than quite financially sophisticated and therefore readily able to comprehend the terms of the funding agreement relating to commission.

Second, the notice advising the group members of the proposed settlement included notification that, under the proposed settlement, the funder would receive commission of not more than \$7.375 million, which represented not more than 25 per cent of the settlement sum. As already noted, no group member opposed the proposed settlement, including that payment to the funder.

Third, I am aware that settlements involving funder commission rates of 25 per cent have been approved in several recent cases: see, for example, *Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3)* (2020) 385 ALR 625; [2020] FCA 1885 at [27]-[28]; *Endeavour River Pty Ltd v MG Responsible Entity Ltd (No 2)* [2020] FCA 968 at [37], [38] and [47]; see also the discussion in *Haselhurst v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd t/as Toyota Australia* [2022] NSWSC 1076 at [56]. I should emphasise, however, that each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances, and it would be wrong to focus too much on what are said to be "market rates" or funding rates which have been approved in other cases.

Fourth, the nature and complexity of this case meant that the funder was exposed to considerable risk in funding the litigation. The proceeding was on foot for a number of years and only settled shortly prior to trial. The funder paid significant legal costs incurred by the applicant. Subject to the discussion later concerning the ATE insurance policy, the funder was also at risk of adverse costs orders should the applicant have failed at trial.

Fifth, the reasonableness of the commission payments to be made to the funder must be considered in the context of the settlement as a whole. In the present case, that includes consideration of other "project costs" payable to the funder – in particular, the ATE insurance premiums. Plainly, the fact that the proposed settlement also involved the payment of those

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premiums is relevant to the reasonableness of the commission payable to the funder. That is because the ATE insurance policy aimed to protect the funder from some of the very risks involved in the funding of the litigation that the commission payable is intended to reward the funder for taking on.

Is it fair and reasonable in the context of this settlement for the funder to be paid not only a commission of 25.3 per cent of the settlement sum but also to be reimbursed in respect of the ATE insurance premiums? This was not an issue that was adverted to or addressed in the applicant's submissions in support of the approval application. As already noted, the proposed settlement orders envisage that \$798,085.19 will be deducted from the settlement sum and paid to the funder in respect of ATE insurance premiums. The evidence reveals that the insurance covered the funder in respect of any liability to pay Sims' costs up to a limit of \$3 million. The policy therefore did not entirely cover the funder in respect of the risks it took on in funding the litigation.

The funding agreements executed by the funded group members provided that the funder would pay for the "project costs", which would include the costs of any adverse costs order, and that the funded group member would pay from the claim proceeds their share of the project costs paid by the funder. The notice advising the group members of the proposed settlement also disclosed that "after the event insurance premiums in the amount of \$732,188.25 plus any applicable tax payable (but not paid) by the funder" would be deducted from the settlement fund. As has already been noted, no group member opposed the settlement.

Some doubt has been cast on the reasonableness of a funder receiving, as part of a settlement, both a sizeable commission and a payment in respect of ATE insurance premiums: see *Perera v GetSwift Ltd* (2018) 263 FCR 1; [2018] FCA 732 at [193]; *Asirifi-Otchere* at [32]; *Court v Spotless Group Holdings Ltd* [2020] FCA 1730 at [96]. There are, however, some cases in which settlements have been approved in circumstances where funders received both commission and reimbursement of ATE insurance premiums: see *Wetdal Pty Ltd as Trustee for the BlueCo Two Superannuation Fund v Estia Health Ltd* [2021] FCA 475 at [125]. None of these cases were drawn to my attention by counsel for the applicant.

This issue was recently addressed by Black J in *Williamson v Sydney Olympic Park Authority* [2022] NSWSC 1618. His Honour dealt with the issue at [83] in the following way:

... It seems to me that the question for the court is not whether the ATE costs in

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isolation from the funder commission or the funder commission in isolation from the ATE costs are unduly high but whether the totality of the funder commission and ATE costs are so high that the settlement documented by the settlement deed and SDS (as distinct from the HOA, which does not provide for the payment) are not reasonable unless they reduced ...

- Justice Black concluded that, in the circumstances of the case his Honour was considering, the deduction of both the funder's commission and the ATE insurance premiums would be unreasonable and that it would be appropriate to reduce the total amount payable. The question whether the Court had the power to vary the commission that was payable under the relevant funding agreements did not arise. That is because the parties ultimately consented to an amendment to the proposed settlement which had the effect of reducing the overall payment to the funder.
- I respectfully agree with the approach taken by Black J in *Williamson*.
- I have given anxious consideration to whether the total amount payable to the funder in the proposed settlement of this matter is reasonable. In particular, I have considered whether it is reasonable that the funder receive both funding commission totalling \$5,440,557.67 as well as a payment of \$798,085.19 to reimburse it in respect of ATE insurance premiums.
- If I was of the view that the overall amount to be received by the funder was unreasonable, I would not have sought to vary the funder's contractual entitlements under its funding agreements. Rather, I would have refused to approve the settlement unless and until the parties and the funder agreed that the funder would accept a lesser amount. Ultimately, however, the matter has not come to that.
- While I initially had some misgivings concerning the overall amount to be received by the funder and, in particular, the fact that the funder was to receive not only a substantial commission, but also the reimbursement of ATE insurance premiums, I am ultimately persuaded (though not by any submission made on the applicant's behalf) that the amount is not such that it can be concluded that the settlement overall is not fair and reasonable from the group members' perspective. I am ultimately satisfied that the large amount payable to the funder is not unfair or unreasonable in all the circumstances and should not stand in the way of approving what, on the whole, is a fair and reasonable settlement.

Funding equalisation

- The proposed settlement is structured in such a way that the amounts payable by the funded group members in respect of legal fees and disbursements, including administration costs and funding costs (including commission and the ATE insurance premiums), are calculated and quantified and deducted from the settlement fund before the fund is distributed among the group members as a whole. This is a means by which the legal and funding costs incurred by the funded group members is ultimately borne by all group members. As noted earlier, counsel for the applicant called this aspect of the settlement the funding equalisation order or FEO, even though the orders proposed by the applicant did not include any specific or identifiable order which had the effect of spreading the litigation costs and expenses equally between the group members.
- It has been accepted that the spreading of the litigation and funding costs between all group members, irrespective of whether they had entered into retainers or funding agreements, is fair and equitable and avoids what is referred to as "free riding". In *BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster* (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45, Kiefel CJ and Bell and Keane JJ addressed the issue in the following way (at [88]-[90]):

A CFO [common fund order] is thus not the obvious solution to the problem of "free riding". A CFO is apt to impose an additional cost on the group by requiring more money to be paid to the litigation funder than would otherwise be the case. The equitable spreading of the cost is, in fact, better achieved by the making of a FEO [funding equalisation order], which takes, as its starting point, the actual cost incurred in funding the litigation. While it must be accepted that the burden of the amounts that funded group members have agreed to pay to the funder under their agreements with the funder must be distributed fairly, a FEO is apt equitably to distribute those amounts whereas a CFO seeks to impose an additional cost by imposing new obligations on the unfunded group members.

A FEO is clearly available where a settlement is reached. A settlement must be approved by the court, and, in approving a settlement, the court must be satisfied that it is "fair and reasonable to all group members". A settlement that allows some group members to ride for free would not be fair and reasonable to the other group members.

Secondly, where a matter runs to judgment (rather than being settled), a FEO may be made under s 33ZF or s 183. That is because justice would not be done in the proceeding if it resulted in unfunded group members gaining a windfall by avoiding costs which others bore for their benefit. A FEO prevents that outcome by redistributing those costs. It falls squarely within the terms of ss 33ZF and 183. The same cannot be said of a CFO.

I am satisfied that the means by which the litigation and funding costs are spread among all group members in the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable.

Proportionality of costs and funding charges overall

- The final issue to consider in determining whether the settlement is fair and reasonable is the proportionality of the costs and funding charges as against group member recoveries.
- To recap, the following sums are to be deducted from the settlement sum of \$29.5 million: \$6,259,515.64 to be paid to the funder in respect of the project costs paid by the funder (comprising legal costs and disbursements paid by the funder and \$798,085.19 paid or payable by the funder in respect of ATE insurance premiums); \$5,440,557.67 to be paid to the funder as funding commission; \$3,022,648.49 to be paid to the applicant's solicitors in respect of outstanding legal fees and disbursements; an amount of \$241,123.95 to be paid to the applicant's solicitors in their capacity as administrators of the settlement scheme for administration costs; and \$10,000 to be paid to the applicant by way of reimbursement for the time and expenses incurred in the litigation.
- When those sums are deducted from the settlement sum, the balance to be distributed to group members in accordance with the distribution scheme is \$14,526,154.25. That is just over 50 per cent of the settlement sum.
- In my view, the overall deductions are not disproportionate to the group member recoveries in all the circumstances. That is so given the difficult and complex nature of the litigation, the risks inherent in such litigation and the lateness of the proposed settlement.

CONCLUSION IN RESPECT OF THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT

Having considered the detailed evidence adduced by the applicant and the written and oral submissions advanced on the applicant's behalf, I am satisfied that the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable to the group members as a whole and should be approved. I propose to make the orders sought by the applicant to approve and give effect to the settlement.

CONFIDENTIALITY

The applicant has sought suppression or non-publication orders pursuant to s 37AF and s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act in respect of certain documents on the basis that such orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. There are two broad classes of documents in respect of which the orders are sought. As will be seen, the confidentiality orders applicable to the second category operate for only a limited period of time.

The first category, detailed in 'Annexure A' to the proposed orders, includes the confidential opinions of counsel in respect of the proceeding and the proposed settlement. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make a non-publication order in respect of those opinions given that they contain confidential legal advice that would in any event be the subject of legal professional privilege. Confidentiality orders should generally be made in respect of documents of this nature so as to encourage candour in respect of settlement approval applications.

54 The other document in the first category of documents is the ATE insurance policy taken out by the funder. That policy contains a confidentiality clause. It is apparently on that basis that the non-publication order is sought. Despite that confidentiality clause, I am not persuaded that disclosure of the terms of the policy would cause prejudice to the proper administration of justice, other than perhaps in circumstances where the settlement was not approved. I will, however, include this document in the orders which relate to the second category of documents. If any person wishes for me to make an order specifically protecting this document from disclosure for a longer period, they may apply for such an order within 49 days after the approval of the settlement.

The second category of documents, detailed in 'Annexure B' to the proposed orders, are documents the disclosure of which would cause prejudice to the proper administration of justice if the settlement is not approved. The non-publication order sought in respect of those documents expires 49 days after the approval of the settlement. That is no doubt designed to take into account the possibility, remote as it may seem, that an appeal is filed in respect of the approval of the settlement. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make the limited non-publication orders in respect of the second category of documents on the basis that they would prejudice the applicant and group members if the orders approving the settlement are the subject of a successful appeal and the matter does not ultimately settle.

I accordingly will make the orders provided to the Court in respect of both the settlement approval and the confidentiality of certain documents tendered as part of the approval process. As already noted, I propose to make some minor changes to the proposed confidentiality orders, some of which need not be addressed in these reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney.

Associate:

Dated: 28 February 2023

ANNEXURE A – Confidential until further order

No	Description of	Court	Page(s) of	Details concerning aspect	Basis for
	filed document	Book	document	of document over which	confidentiality
		reference		the confidentiality order	
				applies	
1.	Exhibit BP-12 to	Vol 2	All pages 1	Entire document.	Legal professional
	the second	983-1040	- 58		privilege (including legal
	affidavit of				advice privilege and/or
	Blagoj (Bill)				litigation privilege)
	Petrovski sworn 1				(Privilege).
	October 2022				
2.	Exhibit BP-15 to	Vol 2	All pages	Entire document.	Privilege.
	the fourth	1098A-	1 – 9		
	affidavit of	1098J			
	Blagoj (Bill)				
	Petrovski sworn				
	12 October 2022				

ANNEXURE B – Confidential until 49 days after the date of the approval order

No	Description of	Court Book	Page(s) of	Details	Basis for confidentiality
	filed document	(CB)	document	concerning	
		reference		aspect of	
				document over	
				which the	
				confidentiality	
				order applies	
1.	Referee Report	Vol 2	10 – 11	Entire	Provides the terms of settlement,
	of Ian Ramsey-	263-264		paragraphs 36	which pursuant to clause 11(a) of
	Stewart dated			(except the	the Deed of Settlement, are
	23 September			chapeau) and	confidential until orders
	2022			37.	approving the settlement on the
					terms set out in the Deed of
					Settlement and the Settlement
					Scheme pursuant to section 33V
					of the Act are made
					(Confidential in accordance
					with Deed).
2.		Vol 2	13	The figures	Provides information which has
		266		contained in	strategic value to the Respondent
				paragraph 51	and may prejudice the Applicant
				and the first	and GMs should settlement not
				sentence of	be approved (Prejudicial if no
				paragraph 55.	approval).
3.		Vol 2	44	The figure	Prejudicial if no approval.
		297 and 689		contained in	
		[Please note:		paragraph 14(a),	
		where there		the figure	
		is more than		contained in	
		one CB		paragraph 15	
		reference for		and the figures	
		the same		contained in	
		table item,		paragraph 16.	
		the			
		document			
		appears			

	more than			
	more than once in the			
	CB and the			
	same			
	redactions			
	have been			
	applied.]			
4.	Vol 2	79 – 103	Entire pages.	Prejudicial if no approval.
	332-356 and			Contains Confidential Annexure
	724-748			B to the Referee Report dated 23
				September 2022.
5.	Vol 2	116	Entire	Contains commercially sensitive
	369 and 650		paragraphs 3	information, which would be
			and 4.	detrimental to ICP if competitors
				in the market had access to that
				information (Commercially
				Sensitive).
				Prejudicial if no approval.
6.	Vol 2	126	Entire clause	Commercially sensitive.
	379 and 660		6.1 (except the	Prejudicial if no approval.
			chapeau).	
7.	Vol 2	127	The percentage	Commercially sensitive.
	380 and 661		figures in	Prejudicial if no approval.
			clauses 7.1, 7.2	
			and 7.3.	
8.	Vol 2	128	The percentage	Commercially sensitive.
	381 and 662		figure in clause	Prejudicial if no approval.
			7.6.	
9.	Vol 2	130	Entire clause 10	Prejudicial if no approval.
	383 and 664		except the	. 11
			heading	
			"Termination".	
10.	Vol 2	135 – 136	Entire clauses	Commercially sensitive.
10.	388-389 and	133 - 130	2.6, and 2.8.	Commercially sonsitive.
	669-670		Also, the	
	007-070			
			percentage	
			figures in	
			clauses 2.9 and	
			2.10.	

11.		Vol 2	144	The figure	Prejudicial if no approval.
		397 and 678		contained in the	
				second line of	
				clause 4.5, the	
				entire sub-	
				paragraphs of	
				clause 4.5(a)-(b)	
				(including the	
				chapeau) and	
				the last sentence	
				of clause 4.5.	
12.		Vol 2	145 – 147	Entire clause 6.	Prejudicial if no approval.
		398-400 and			
		679-681			
13.		Vol 2	152	Entire page.	Prejudicial if no approval.
		405 and 686			
14.		Vol 2	154	Entire body of	Privilege.
		407		the letter	
				(paragraphs 1 to	
				4).	
15.		Vol 2	155	Entire body of	Privilege.
		408		the email	
				(paragraphs 1 to	
				3 including	
				headings).	
16.	Appendix 5 of	Excel	Tab "S2 -	Entire columns	Prejudicial if no approval.
	the Referee	spreadsheet	IRS	D (Description)	
	Report of Ian	saved on	Adjusted	and G (Units).	
	Ramsey-	USB	Fees"		
	Stewart dated	provided			
	23 September	with Court			
	2022	Book			
17.		Excel	Tab "S2A –	Entire columns	Prejudicial if no approval.
		spreadsheet	IRS Cross-	D (Description)	
		saved on	Check"	and G (Units).	
		USB			
		provided			
		with Court			
		Book			
17.		spreadsheet saved on USB provided with Court	IRS Cross-	D (Description)	Prejudicial if no approval.

18.	Excel	Tab "S3 –	Entire columns	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	WIP	B (Description)	
	saved on	02.06.22 to	and E (Units).	
	USB	02.09.22"		
	provided			
	with Court			
	Book			
19.	Excel	Tab "S5 -	Entire columns	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	Rate	G (Sum of	
	saved on	Comparison	Units) and J	
	USB	Analysis"	(Sum of Units).	
	provided			
	with Court			
	Book			
20.	Excel	Tab "S11 -	Entire	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	WRL	worksheet.	
	saved on	Estimate to		
	USB	13.10.22"		
	provided			
	with Court			
	Book			
21.	Excel	Tab "S12 -	Entire	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	WRL	worksheet.	
	saved on	Estimate for		
	USB	SDS"		
	provided			
	with Court			
	Book			
22.	Excel	Tab "S13 -	Entire columns	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	Hours	B (Units), G (S2	
	saved on	worked from	units) and H (S3	
	USB	S2"	units).	
	provided			
	with Court			
	Book			
23.	Excel	Tab "S14 -	Entire column B	Prejudicial if no approval.
	spreadsheet	Hours	(Units).	
	saved on	worked from		
	USB	S3"		

		provided			
		with Court			
		Book			
24	A 1'- 0 C		T. 1	E 4	D '-1' '1'C1
24.	Appendix 8 of		Tab	Entire	Prejudicial if no approval.
	the	spreadsheet	"Revised	worksheet.	
	Supplementary	saved on	S11 – WRL		
	Referee Report	USB	Est		
	of Ian Ramsey-	provided	13.10.22"		
	Stewart dated	with Court			
	28 September	Book			
	2022				
25.	Confidential	Vol 2	3 – 117	Entire	Confidential in accordance with
	Exhibit CEJ-2	491-605		document.	Deed.
	to the affidavit				
	of Carlos				
	Jaramillo sworn				
26	1 July 2022	77.10	21	TIL C	D ' 1' ' 1'C
26.	First Affidavit	Vol 2	21	The figures	Prejudicial if no approval.
	of Blagoj (Bill)	626		contained in the	
	Petrovski sworn			tables at	
	1 October 2022			paragraphs	
				75(a)-(c).	
27.		Vol 2	21 – 22	The entire first	Prejudicial if no approval.
		626-627		paragraph 75(d)	
				except for the	
				words "The SDS	
				contemplates"	
				and the words "I	
				am informed by	
				Mr Lei that this	
				is correct and is	
				a feature of the	
				application to	
				the trade data of	
				the loss	
				assessment	
				formula, which	
				is a confidential	
				is a conjugatiful	

			schedule to the	
			SDS (Loss	
			Assessment	
			Formula)."	
			The figures and	
			headings	
			contained in the	
			table at	
			paragraph	
			75(d).	
28.	Vol 2	23 - 24	Third sentence	Prejudicial if no approval.
	628-629		in paragraph 79	
			which begins	
			with "Further,	
			the Loss	
			Assessment	
			Formula	
			applies a	
			weighting".	
29.	Vol 2	33	Entire	Commercially sensitive.
	638		paragraph 107	Prejudicial if no approval.
			except for the	Trejunitari in ne uppre tun
			words "Further,	
			Clause 6.1 of	
			_	
			the Funding	
			Agreement	
			states:"	
30.	Vol 2	34	Entire	Commercially sensitive.
	639		paragraph	Prejudicial if no approval.
			109(g).	
31.	Vol 2	36 – 37	The figure	Paragraph 121(b): Prejudicial if
	641-642		contained in	no approval.
			paragraph	Paragraph 121(c): Prejudicial if
			121(b).	no approval.
			The figure	Paragraph 121(d): Privilege.
			contained in	
			paragraph	
			121(c).	
			Entire	
			2.11.11.0	

				paragraph	
				121(d).	
32.	Exhibit BP-10	Vol 2	112 – 150	Entire pages.	Contains the Heads of
	to the first	756-794			Agreement, Deed of Settlement
	affidavit of				and Deed of Variation.
	Blagoj (Bill)				Confidential in accordance with
	Petrovski sworn				Deed.
	1 October 2022				
33.		Vol 2	163	Entire page	Prejudicial if no approval.
		807		except the	
				heading	
				"Schedule Loss	
				Assessment	
				Formula".	
34.		Vol 2	164 – 168	Entire pages.	Prejudicial if no approval.
		808-812			
35.		Vol 2	273	Entire body of	Prejudicial if no approval.
		917		email.	
36.		Vol 2	308 – 311	Entire column	Privilege.
		952-955		under the	
				heading "Work	
				Done" (third	
				column from	
				left).	
37.		Vol 2	336	All the figures	Prejudicial if no approval.
		980		contained in the	
				table.	
38.	Third Affidavit	Vol 2	5-6	The figures	Prejudicial if no approval.
	of Blagoj (Bill)	1041E-		contained in the	
	Petrovski sworn	1041F		tables at	
	12 October			paragraphs	
	2022			12(a)-(d) and	
				the entire first	
				paragraph 12(d)	
				except for the	
				words "The SDS	
				contemplates"	
				and the words "I	
				am informed by	

				Mr Lei that this	
				is correct and is	
				a feature of the	
				application to	
				the trade data of	
				the Loss	
				Assessment	
				Formula."	
39.	Exhibit BP-13	Vol 2	28-33	Entire pages	Prejudicial if no approval.
	to the Third	1042AC-		except for the	
	Affidavit of	1042AH		heading words	
	Blagoj (Bill)			"Schedule" and	
	Petrovski sworn			"Loss	
	on 12 October			Assessment	
	2022			Formula " on	
				page 28.	
40.	Affidavit of	Vol 2	14-15	Subparagraphs	Commercially sensitive.
	John Walker	1057-1058		65(a) and 65(b);	Prejudicial if no approval.
	affirmed 11			in paragraph 66,	
	October 2022			the words after	
				"commission at"	
				and before "the	
				ICP Entities"	
				and the words	
				after "this	
				circumstance	
				is".	
41.		Vol 2	16	Paragraph 75(a)	Prejudicial if no approval.
41.			10		r rejudiciai ii iio approvai.
		1059		- the words after	
				"the total" and	
				before the	
				words "as set	
				out".	
42.	Confidential	Vol 2	30-53	Entire	Confidential based on the non-
	Exhibit JW-2 to	1073-1096		document.	disclosure clause in the AmTrust
	the affidavit of				policy (clause 4.13).
	John Walker				
	affirmed 11				
	October 2022				
	1		1	1	<u>i</u>